Strengthening incentives for truth-telling in Majority voting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kirneva, Margarita; Nunez, Matias
• 署名单位: CUNEF Universidad; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; ENSAE Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106168
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: VIRTUAL IMPLEMENTATION; undominated strategies; Nash implementation; THEOREM; MASKIN

摘要

All currently known mechanisms that fully implement Majority rule are either infinite (integer games) or rely on off-equilibrium transfers. We propose a finite mechanism with no transfers, called Bloc formation, that achieves this goal in pure and mixed strategies. It increases the set of instances where any agent is pivotal by relying on off-equilibrium lotteries, and thus, incentivizes truth-telling.