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作者：Sekiguchi, T
摘要：This paper analyzes repeated games with private monitoring, where in each period each player receives a signal of the other player's action in the previous period, and that signal is private information. Previous literature on discounted repeated games with private monitoring has not shown whether or not (nearly) efficient equilibria exist For a repeated prisoner's dilemma satisfying a certain assumption regarding stage game payoffs, we show that there exists a nearly efficient sequential equi...
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作者：Suarez, J; Sussman, O
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：The literature on financial imperfections and business cycles has focused on propagation mechanisms. In this paper we model a pure reversion mechanism, such that the economy may converge to a two-period equilibrium cycle. This mechanism confirms that financial imperfections may have a dramatic amplification effect. Unlike in some related models, contracts are complete. Indexation is not assumed away. The welfare properties of a possible stabilizing policy are analyzed. The model itself is a dy...
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作者：Bag, PK
摘要：I examine a standard public goods provision problem and show that a simple adaptation of the Jackson-Moulin mechanism (J. Econ. Theory 57 (1992), 125-140) to divisible public goods achieves the socially efficient outcome and implements a family of cost-sharing rules in undominated Nash equilibria of a two-stage game, when agents' benefits from public good consumption are linear. Agents know their own marginal benefits and at least two agents with positive marginal benefits know the aggregate m...
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作者：Boyd, JH; Smith, BD
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We consider a two country growth model with international capital markets. These markets fund capital investment in both countries, and operate subject to a costly state verification (CSV) problem. Investors in each country require some external finance, but also provide internal finance, which mitigates the CSV problem. When two identical (except for their initial capital stocks) economies are closed, they necessarily converge monotonically to the same steady state output level. Unrestricted ...
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作者：Fershtman, C; Rubinstein, A
作者单位：Tilburg University; Princeton University
摘要：The paper presents a simple game-theoretic model in which players decide on search procedures For a prize located in one of a set of labeled boxes. The prize is awarded to the player who Finds it first. A player can decide on the number of (costly) search units he employs and on the order in which he conducts the search. It is shown that in equilibrium, the players employ an equal number of search units and conduct a completely random search. The paper demonstrates that the search procedure is...
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作者：Gilles, RP; Scotchmer, S
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We show that ''exhaustion of blocking opportunities'' is a sufficient condition such that every allocation in the core of a replicated club economy can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium, and that a related condition ''efficient scale'' is necessary and - under an assumption on endowments - sufficient such that competitive equilibrium exists and the core is nonempty. These results do not require the Euclidean structure and monotonicity assumed in Lindahl equilibrium, do not require ...
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作者：Gauthier, C; Poitevin, M; Gonzalez, P
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We analyze a long-term risk-sharing contract between two risk-averse agents facing self-enforcing constraints. We enlarge the contracting space to allow for an ex ante transfer before the state of nature is realized and we characterize the optimal ex ante and ex post payments. We show that optimal ex ante payments are inversely related to the non-stationary expected surplus. With i.i.d. shocks, the dynamics of the optimal contract exhibit ''experience rating'' even though there is no private i...
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作者：Peters, M; Severinov, S
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：In this paper we study a large market in which sellers compete by offering auctions to buyers instead of simple fixed price contracts. Two variants of the model are studied. One extends a model first analyzed by Wolinsky (Reo. Econ. Stud. 55 (1988), 71-84) in which buyers learn their valuations only after meeting sellers. The other variant extends the model of McAfee (Econometrica, 61 (1993), 1281-1312) In which buyers know their valuations before they choose among available auctions. The equi...
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作者：Robles, J
摘要：This note applies the evolutionary dynamic of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (Econometrica 61 (1993), 29-65) to class coordination games that the entire population plays simultaneously In these games, payoffs. and best replies are determined by a symmary statistic of the population strategy profile as in Crawford (Econometrica 63 (1995), 103-114). A simple characterization of the set of Long Run Equilibria, analogous to the one given by Kandori, Mailath, and Rob for random pairing, is provided. Jou...
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作者：Manelli, AM
作者单位：University of Iowa
摘要：This essay considers a strong refinement of the sequential equilibrium concept, the Never-a-Weak-Best-Response test, and identifies conditions under which the limit of the equilibrium outcomes of finite approximating games is an equilibrium outcome of the limit infinite game. As a consequence of this result, the existence of equilibria in a class of infinite signaling games is established. Since equilibria satisfying the Never-a-Weak-Best-Response test also satisfy various other refinements, e...
