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作者：Garratt, R; Qin, CZ
摘要：Given a game, the set of joint lotteries over partitions of the agents of any subgame induces a subset of the vectors of balancing weights for the subgame. Games whose subgames are all balanced with respect to these vectors of balancing weights are called totally L-balanced games. We show that such games are precisely the ones that can be generated from direct lottery markets. Total L-balancedness is equivalent to superadditivity. Thus, many interesting games that are not totally balanced, but...
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作者：Skiadas, C
摘要：This paper provides an axiomatic basis for a representation of personal preferences in which the utility of an act can be expressed as an expected value of conditional utilities of the act given any set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive scenarios, under a unique subjective probability. The representation is general enough to incorporate state-dependent utilities and/or utilities with dependencies across states, as, for example, in the case of disappointment aversion. More generally, this is...
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作者：Mitra, T; Ok, EA
作者单位：New York University
摘要：We propose the principle of equal sacrifice to determine the class of ''vertically inequitable'' progressive taxes. A necessary condition for an income tax Function to be equal sacrifice is formulated, and hence, a subclass of progressive taxes which cannot inflict the same sacrifice upon all individuals relative to any strictly increasing and concave utility function is determined. Conversely, it is shown in a general framework that any convex (thus progressive) tax function satisfies the pri...
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作者：Barbera, S; Masso, J; Neme, A
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Universidad Nacional de San Luis
摘要：We consider a broad class of situations where 3 society must choose from a finite set of alternatives. This class includes, as polar cases, those where the preferences of agents are completely unrestricted and those where their preferences are single-peaked. We prove that strategy-proof mechanisms in all these domains must be based on a generalization of the median voter principle. Moreover, they must satisfy a property, to be called the ''intersection property,'' which becomes increasingly st...
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作者：Dubey, P; Neyman, A
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：Four axioms are placed oil a correspondence from smooth, non-atomic economies to their allocations. We show than thr axioms categorically determine, the (coincident) competitive-core-value correspondence. Thus any solution is equivalent to the above three if, and only if, it satisfies the axioms. In this sense our result is tantamount to an ''equivalence principle.'' At the same time, our result implies that the three solutions themselves are determined by the axions and so serves as an axioma...
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作者：Aiyagari, SR; Wallace, N
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Miami
摘要：Policy regarding what the government accepts in transactions is embedded in a version of the Kiyotaki-Wright model of media of exchange. In an example with two goods and one fiat money, the policies that are consistent with fiat money as the unique medium of exchange are identified. These policies have the government favoring fiat money in its transactions. A benefit and a cost accompany any such policy. The benefit is that a worse nonmonetary steady state is eliminated; the cost is that a bet...
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作者：Borgers, T; Sarin, R
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：This paper considers a version of R. R. Bush and F. Mosteller's (1951, Psych. Rev. 58. 313-323; 1955, ''Stochastic Models for Learning,'' Wiley, New York) stochastic learning theory in the context of games. We show that in a continuous time limit the learning model converges to the replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory. Thus we provide a non-biological interpretation of evolutionary game theory. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：Xie, DY
摘要：Stackelberg differential games are useful settings in which optimal government policies can be studied. This paper argues that the analysis of these games involves a key technical issue. In particular, we question the necessity for optimality of one boundary condition invoked in existing literature. The issue is of key interest because the boundary condition is largely responsible for the time inconsistency results previously obtained. We show that the boundary condition is not necessary in so...
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作者：Fisher, EO
摘要：This note shows that there are monetary equilibria in the model of overlapping generations that are in the core. Some equilibria have positive stocks of outside money in every generation. These equilibria are thus self-enforcing, and introducing money into an economy need not be tantamount to contriving a new social institution designed to enforce sequential contracts. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：McKelvey, RD; Palfrey, TR
摘要：We investigate an infinite horizon two-person simultaneous move bargaining game with incomplete information and discounted payoffs. The game takes the form of a concession game: in each period, each player chooses to give in or hold out. The game continues until at least one of the players chooses to give in, at which point agreement has been reached and the game terminates. For any discount factor, if the players' priors about each other's type are sufficiently asymmetric, there is a unique N...
