Decentralization in replicated club economies with multiple private goods
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Gilles, RP; Scotchmer, S
署名单位：
University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.2221
发表日期：
1997
页码：
363-387
关键词：
摘要：
We show that ''exhaustion of blocking opportunities'' is a sufficient condition such that every allocation in the core of a replicated club economy can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium, and that a related condition ''efficient scale'' is necessary and - under an assumption on endowments - sufficient such that competitive equilibrium exists and the core is nonempty. These results do not require the Euclidean structure and monotonicity assumed in Lindahl equilibrium, do not require convexity of preferences or costs, and do not require the strong assumption that private goods are ''essential''. (C) 1997 Academic Press.