Competition among Sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Peters, M; Severinov, S
署名单位：
Stanford University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2278
发表日期：
1997
页码：
141-179
关键词：
摘要：
In this paper we study a large market in which sellers compete by offering auctions to buyers instead of simple fixed price contracts. Two variants of the model are studied. One extends a model first analyzed by Wolinsky (Reo. Econ. Stud. 55 (1988), 71-84) in which buyers learn their valuations only after meeting sellers. The other variant extends the model of McAfee (Econometrica, 61 (1993), 1281-1312) In which buyers know their valuations before they choose among available auctions. The equilibrium array of auctions is characterized for each case and the efficiency properties of the equilibria are analyzed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D41, D44, D82. (C) 1997 Academic Press.