Evolution and long run equilibria in coordination games with summary statistic payoff technologies
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Robles, J
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2274
发表日期：
1997
页码：
180-193
关键词：
摘要：
This note applies the evolutionary dynamic of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (Econometrica 61 (1993), 29-65) to class coordination games that the entire population plays simultaneously In these games, payoffs. and best replies are determined by a symmary statistic of the population strategy profile as in Crawford (Econometrica 63 (1995), 103-114). A simple characterization of the set of Long Run Equilibria, analogous to the one given by Kandori, Mailath, and Rob for random pairing, is provided. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C79. (C) 1997 Academic Press.