Public goods provision: Applying Jackson-Moulin mechanism for restricted agent characteristics
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Bag, PK
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.2232
发表日期：
1997
页码：
460-472
关键词：
摘要：
I examine a standard public goods provision problem and show that a simple adaptation of the Jackson-Moulin mechanism (J. Econ. Theory 57 (1992), 125-140) to divisible public goods achieves the socially efficient outcome and implements a family of cost-sharing rules in undominated Nash equilibria of a two-stage game, when agents' benefits from public good consumption are linear. Agents know their own marginal benefits and at least two agents with positive marginal benefits know the aggregate marginal benefit. The planner, however, does not know agents' characteristics or aggregate marginal benefit. (C) 1997 Academic Press.