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作者：Thomson, W
摘要：Our objective is to investigate the implications of the ''replacement principle'' for the fair allocation of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences, The principle says that when one of the components of the data entering the description of the problem to be solved changes, all of the relevant agents should be affected in the same direction: they all gain or they all lose. We apply it to situations in which the preferences of one of the agents may change, ...
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作者：Weymark, JA
摘要：This article considers the aggregation of individual probability binary relations (ordinal probabilities) into a consensus relation when the set of states is finite. The structure imposed on such an aggregation function by unanimity and independence conditions found in the social choice literature is determined. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：Becker, R; Zilcha, I
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：Deterministic dynamic equilibrium models with borrowing constraints and heterogeneous agents exhibit stationary solutions where thr most patient household owns the economy's capital stock;. An example shows that this result does not carry over to stationary stochastic environments. Wa prove, under some conditions, the existence of a stationary rational expectations equilibrium in two related setups. The first is the existence of a stationary Nash equilibrium where each agent's payoff depends o...
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作者：Binmore, K; Samuelson, L
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：This paper examines an evolutionary model in which the primary source of ''noise'' that moves the model between equilibria is not arbitrarily improbable mutations but mistakes in learning. We model strategy selection as a birth-death process, allowing us to find a simple, closed-form solution for the stationary distribution. We examine equilibrium selection by considering the limiting case as the population gets large, eliminating aggregate noise. Conditions are established under which the ris...
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作者：Bloch, F; Ghosal, S
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; University of London; University College London; University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：This paper analyzes the formation of trading groups in a bilateral market where agents trade according to a Shayley-Shubik (J. Polit. Econ. 85 (1977), 937-968.) trading mechanism. The only strongly stable trading structure is the grand coalition, where all agents trade on the same market. Other weakly stable trading structures exist and are characterized by an ordering property: trading groups can be ranked by size and cannot contain very different numbers of traders of the two types. (C) 1997...
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作者：Zapater, I
摘要：We present a nonequilibrium theory for simple communication games and use this theory to construct a new way of examining the problem of equilibrium selection in signaling and communication games. Our approach differs from the current literature in that the beliefs of the receiver after receiving an unexpected message are independent of the equilibrium payoffs. This property makes our approach immune to criticisms of conventional refinements, such as the Stiglitz critique. (C) 1997 Academic Pr...
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作者：Zhou, L
摘要：In this paper I investigate Harsanyi's utilitarianism aggregation theorems for general societies. It is proved that the social utility function is a linear (and non-negative) aggregation of individual utility functions if and only if the Pareto indifference (or the Pareto) condition holds, and that the linear aggregation has an integral representation under some regular conditions. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：Blum, Y; Roth, AE; Rothblum, UG
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：In contrast to entry-level professional labor markets, in which cohorts of candidates and positions become available at the same time (e.g., when candidates graduate from school), senior level positions typically become available when an incumbent retires, or a new position is created, and when a senior position is filled a new vacancy is often created elsewhere. We model senior level labor markets as two-sided matching markets in which matchings are destabilized by retirements and new entries...
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作者：Merlin, VR; Saari, DG
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：An important issue for economics and the decision sciences is to understand why allocation and decision procedures are plagued by manipulative and paradoxical behavior once there are n greater than or equal to 3 alternatives. Valuable insight is obtained by exploiting the relative simplicity of the widely used Copeland method (CM). By using a geometric approach, we characterize all CM manipulation, monotonicity, consistency, and involvement properties while identifying all profiles which are s...
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作者：Carlsson, H; Dasgupta, S
作者单位：Lund University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：An equilibrium of a signaling game is noise-proof if it survives a small perturbation of the Receiver's perception of the signal. We derive conditions for noise proofness and prove existence for signaling games where the Receiver has two actions, the message space is a real interval, and standard monotonicity conditions are met. Such ames have a continuum of equilibria which satisfy the never-a-weak-best-reply criterion (NWBR), but often a unique noise proof equilibrium. Every noise-proof equi...
