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作者：Pietra, T; Siconolfi, P
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Salento
摘要：We study a financial economy with finitely many states of private information. There are two agents, informed and uninformed. We define agents' expectations on future equilibrium prices as a probability distribution over K distinct values, i.e. we introduce K extrinsic events. We show that there are open sets of economies with nonrevealing land also with partially revealing) equilibria: For an appropriate choice of self-fulfilling price expectations, observable equilibrium prices are signal-in...
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作者：Smith, TE; Zenou, Y
作者单位：Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：A two-sector model of urban employment is developed which focuses on the formation of a secondary sector in response to a primary-sector demand shock. The optimal location of this (single-firm) sector is shown to give rise to a multicentric urban spatial structure. Conditions are then established under which the new labor market equilibrium involves both a decrease in unemployment and an increase in net income for those unemployed. These results are extended to a case where all unemployment be...
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作者：Aliprantis, CD
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Purdue University in Indianapolis; Cornell University
摘要：A. Mas-Colell and S. F. Richard (J. Econ. Theory 53 (1991), 1-11) published a remarkable infinite dimensional equilibrium existence theorem for exchange economies that encompasses all the currently available important equilibrium results as corollaries. To prove this theorem, the authors utilized in an ingenious way the lattice structure of Riesz spaces. However, in two critical steps during the proof of the theorem. there is an ''obvious'' claim used by the authors which may fail to be true. ...
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作者：Cole, HL; Prescott, EC
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：This paper considers model worlds in which there is a continuum of individuals who form finite-sized associations to undertake joint activities. We show how, through a suitable choice of commodity space, restrictions on the composition of feasible groups can be incorporated into the specification of the consumption and production sets of the economy. We also show that if there are a finite number of types, then the classical results From the competitive analysis of convex finite-agent economie...
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作者：Burdett, K; Coles, MG
摘要：In a model of noisy search where customers repeat purchase, this paper characterises an equilibrium where each store changes its price as its stock of regular customers changes through time. As stores in the market are of different size (and age), price dispersion is an equilibrium outcome. Along the equilibrium path, smaller (younger) stores announce lower prices and grow faster than larger (established) stores. Furthermore, the youngest stores set prices below marginal cost to build business...
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作者：Einy, E; Holzman, R; Monderer, D; Shitovitz, B
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Haifa
摘要：We show that the core of a continuous convex game on a measurable space of players is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. We also extend the definition of the Mas-Colell bargaining set to games with a measurable space of players and show that for continuous convex games the core may be strictly included in the bargaining set but it coincides with the set of all countably additive payoff measures in the bargaining set. We provide examples which show that the continuity assumption is essential...
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作者：Dutta, B; Masso, J
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：In the standard two-sided matching models, agents on one side of the market (the institutions) can each be matched to a set of agents (the individuals) on the other side of the market, and the individuals only have preferences defined over institutions to which they can be matched. We explicitly study the consequences for stability when the composition of one's co-workers or colleagues can affect the preferences over institutions. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：Aliprantis, CD; Border, KC; Burkinshaw, O
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Purdue University in Indianapolis; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We discuss the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics in the context of the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model with an infinite dimensional commodity space. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C62, D51, D61. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：Monderer, D; Samet, D; Sela, A
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：A learning process is belief affirming if the difference between a player's expected payoff in the next period, and the average of his or her past payoffs converges to zero. We show that every smooth discrete fictitious play and every continuous fictitious play is belief affirming. We also provide conditions under which general averaging processes are belief affirming. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：Vila, JL; Zariphopoulou, T
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：In this paper. we use stochastic dynamic programming to study the intertemporal consumption and portfolio choice of an infinitely lived agent who faces a constant opportunity set and a borrowing constraint, We show that. under general assumptions on the agent's utility function, optimal policies exist and can be expressed as feedback Functions of current wealth. We describe these policies in detail, when the agent's utility function exhibits constant relative risk aversion. (C) 1997 Academic P...
