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作者：Brusco, S
摘要：In this paper we consider the principal-multiple agents problem when collusion among agents is possible. Collusion is captured by the use of equilibrium notions allowing for coalitional deviations. We first analyze the constraints that collusion puts on feasible wage schemes. Differently from the case of subgame perfect implementation the first best is not implementable. We provide a necessary condition that compensation schemes achieving the second best must satisfy. Roughly stated, the condi...
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作者：Epstein, LG
作者单位：University of British Columbia; University of British Columbia
摘要：In the context of finite normal form games, this paper addresses the formalization and implications of the hypothesis that players are rational and that this is common knowledge. The innovation is to admit notions of rationality other than subjective expected utility maximization. For example, rationality can be defined by the alternative restrictions that preferences are probabilistically sophisticated conform to the multiple-priors model or are monotonic. The noted hypothesis is related to s...
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作者：Blackorby, C; Bossert, W; Donaldson, D
作者单位：University of British Columbia; Aix-Marseille Universite; University of Nottingham
摘要：This paper investigates birth-date dependent principles for social evaluation in an intertemporal framework in which population size may vary. WP weaken the strong Pareto principle in order to allow individuals' birth dates to matter in establishing a social ordering. Using the axiom independence of the utilities of the dead, we characterize population principles with a recursive structure. If the individual substitution principle and an individual intertemporal equivalence axiom are added. bi...
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作者：SchmittGrohe, S
摘要：This paper compares four equilibrium business cycle models with increasing returns to scale production technologies that allow for aggregate fluctuations due to self-fulfilling expectations. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria are derived. Numerical examples demonstrate that the degree of increasing returns necessary for the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria lies in the upper range of available empirical estimates. The paper also show...
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作者：Goyal, S; Janssen, MCW
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC
摘要：We study the long run outcome when communities with different conventions interact. We introduce the notion of non-exclusive conventions to model the idea that, by incurring some additional costs agents can remain flexible and hence coordinate their activities more successfully. We show that if these costs of flexibility are low (high) and interaction is local then the Pareto-efficient (risk-dominant) convention prevails in both communities. At intermediate cost levels, the conventions coexist...
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作者：Arya, A; Glover, J; Hughes, JS
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Duke University
摘要：This note studies a moral hazard model of joint production in which there are strong gains to coordination. The mechanism we propose for resolving the tacit collusion problem that arises in our setting makes use of at-will contracts which provide the agents with the option to quit at any time. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：Tauman, Y; Urbano, A; Watanabe, J
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Tel Aviv University; University of Valencia; Fukuoka University
摘要：We provide a simple model of price competition in a multiproduct oligopoly market. The products are of general nature. We find that a pure strategy equilibrium exists and every equilibrium consumption maximizes the total social surplus. Consumers are characterized by a set function which determines their willingness to pay for every subset of products. If this function is convex, the set of equilibrium prices coincides with the core of a cooperative game generated by this set function and the ...
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作者：Qiu, LD
摘要：This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with R&D (research and development) competition. It shows that Cournot competition induces more R&D effort than Bertrand competition. However, the price is lower and output is larger in Bertrand than in Cournot competition. Furthermore, the Bertrand equilibrium is more efficient than the Cournot equilibrium if either R&D productivity is low, or spillovers are weak, or products are very different. If R&D productivit...
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作者：Rauh, MT
摘要：In the literature on search markets, agents know the distribution of prices or learn about it through short run Bayesian updating, even though the first assumption is unrealistic and the empirical evidence emphasizes learning in the intermediate and long runs. In this paper, a new search markets theory is developed where agents have beliefs about the distribution of prices based on finitely many of its moments and past market experiences. The main results are the existence of a Hicks-Grandmont...
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作者：Dastidar, KG
摘要：This paper examines some general notions relating to the comparison of Cournot and Bertrand equilibrium outcomes. Results obtained by Vives in this connection are reconsidered in a homogeneous product market and it is shown that these results are sensitive to the marker sharing rules. It is found that the results are always true under those market sharing rules which have the property of including the competitive equilibrium in the set of Bertrand equilibria (for example, the ''capacity sharin...
