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作者：Wang, C
摘要：M. Jensen and K. Murphy (1990, J. Polit. Econ. 98, 225-264) argue that the observed pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation is too low to be consistent with formal agency theory. This paper uses a dynamic agency model to offer a resolution of the Jensen and Murphy puzzle. We show that the dynamic agency model can predict either a positive or a negative pay-performance sensitivity, depending on the parameter values of the model and the distribution of the CEOs' initial expected discount...
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作者：Tovey, CA
摘要：Balasko and Cres [2] introduce a probabilistic model of population preference profiles on n alternatives. For supermajority voting at any level tau>.5286... they show that the probability of Condorcet cycles (intransitivity of the aggregate preference) tends quickly to 0 as ii increases. This paper offers an alternative analysis that relates voting outcomes to the behavior of sample medians. Condorcet cycles turn out to be asymptotically rare for all tau>1/2, but for the disappointing reason t...
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作者：Hori, H
摘要：This paper is concerned with the issue: Does there exist a social security program which can be maintained period after period? To address this issue, the paper considers dynamic allocation in an altruistic overlapping generations economy. The altruism is intergenerational, nonpaternalistic, and two-sided. Lt is assumed that generations coexisting in the same period agree on a social welfare Function, which evaluates the consumption of various generations, and play a game against those living ...
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作者：McKelvey, RD; McLennan, A
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：Let S=Pi(i=1)(n) S-i be the strategy space for a finite n-person game. Let (s(10),...,s(n0)) epsilon S be any strategy n-tuple, and let T-i=S-i-{s(i0)}, i=1,...,n. We show that the maximum number of regular totally mixed Nash equilibria of a game with strategy sets S-i is the number of partitions P={P-1,...,P-n} of boolean OR(r) T-i such that, for each i, \P-i\=\T-t\ and P-i boolean AND T-i=0. The bound is tight, as we give a method for constructing a game with the maximum number of equilibria...
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作者：Pearce, D; Stacchetti, E
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：In a dynamic economy whose government is interested in both equity and efficiency, time consistency problems arise even if the government has access to nondistortionary tax instruments. Moral hazard in production leads to a non-degenerate distribution of income, which the government would like to ''flatten'' ex post. Self-enforcing social agreements can mitigate the tendency toward excessive redistribution. We investigate the nature of the distortions caused by the time consistency problem, an...
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作者：Bikhchandani, S; Mamer, JW
摘要：We analyze an exchange economy in which (i) all commodities except money are indivisible, (ii) agents' preferences can be described by a reservation value for each bundle of indivisible objects, and (iii) all agents are price-takers. We obtain a necessary and sufficient condition under which market clearing prices exist. Implications for market mechanisms are discussed. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：AlNajjar, NI
摘要：The paper studies a contracting problem in which a principal enters in two-sided moral hazards with N independent agents. There are no technological or informational linkages among the N agency problems. Despite this independence, optimal incentive schemes essentially eliminate the principal's incentive problem when team size is large enough. Reputation-like effects appear in a static setting through an improved aggregation of information about the actions of the principal. One implication of ...
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作者：Deb, R; Pattanaik, PK; Razzolini, L
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside; University of Mississippi
摘要：We consider Sen's familiar paradox of the Paretian liberal in a framework where individual rights are represented as a game form. We distinguish the different senses in which one can think of the problem of an inconsistency between the Pareto criterion and the existence of individual rights. Conditions, in terms of properties of the relevant game form, are given for such inconsistency to arise under different notions of game theoretic equilibria. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：Cazzavillan, G
摘要：This article studies indeterminacy and endogenous growth in a simple one-sector model of capital accumulation, endowed with inelastic labor supply, in which the presence of public goods creates positive externalities both in the production and the consumption sectors. Because of increasing returns in the utility function, the economy exhibits not only perpetual growth but also indeterminacy and. therefore. endogenous stochastic growth fluctuations. The possibility of sunspot equilibrium growth...
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作者：Heifetz, A
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：Parikh and Krasucki (Communication, consensus and knowledge, J. Econ. Theory 52 (1990), 178-189) argued that a group of agents may sometimes reach a consensus when this consensus is not common knowledge among them. We suggest a way to formalize this phenomenon in a rigorous way, by incorporating the time stages into the stare space. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D80. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
