The never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Manelli, AM
署名单位：
University of Iowa
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.2248
发表日期：
1997
页码：
152-173
关键词：
摘要：
This essay considers a strong refinement of the sequential equilibrium concept, the Never-a-Weak-Best-Response test, and identifies conditions under which the limit of the equilibrium outcomes of finite approximating games is an equilibrium outcome of the limit infinite game. As a consequence of this result, the existence of equilibria in a class of infinite signaling games is established. Since equilibria satisfying the Never-a-Weak-Best-Response test also satisfy various other refinements, e.g., the Intuitive Criterion and the Universal Divinity test, the existence results in this essay hold for those refinements as well. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82. (C) 1997 Academic Press.