Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Sekiguchi, T
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2313
发表日期：
1997
页码：
345-361
关键词：
摘要：
This paper analyzes repeated games with private monitoring, where in each period each player receives a signal of the other player's action in the previous period, and that signal is private information. Previous literature on discounted repeated games with private monitoring has not shown whether or not (nearly) efficient equilibria exist For a repeated prisoner's dilemma satisfying a certain assumption regarding stage game payoffs, we show that there exists a nearly efficient sequential equilibrium, provided that imperfectness of signals is small and players are patient. (C) 1997 Academic Press.