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作者：Konishi, H; LeBreton, M; Weber, S
作者单位：Institut Universitaire de France
摘要：In this paper we show that a non-cooperative game with a finite set of players and common finite strategy sets possesses a strong Nash equilibrium in pure strategies whenever individuals' preferences satisfy independence of irrelevant choices, anonymity, and partial rivalry. Moreover, if any of these assumptions is violated, then even a pure strategy Nash equilibrium may fail to exist. Furthermore, we demonstrate that even with a continuum of players, the same three assumptions yield the exist...
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作者：Jackson, MO; Manelli, AM
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：We consider exchange economies where each consumer may report or act according to any demand function provided that there exist situations that the consumer finds plausible in which the reported demand performs at least as well as the true demand. We identify conditions under which, as the size of the economy increases, all the market-clearing prices and allocations of the reported economy approximate the competitive equilibria of the true economy. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：Lambertini, L
作者单位：University of Copenhagen
摘要：The choice between quantity and price in order to stabilize collusion is modeled here. It is shown that this relocates the prisoners' dilemma backward, From the market stage to the stage where the market variable is chosen in order to sustain collusion. and where discount rates appear as the payoffs. Likewise, a prisoners dilemma arises also when both the market variable and the type of behavior (cooperative or non-cooperative) are simultaneously chosen. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：Yosha, O
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：An economy with partially diversified imperfectly competitive (Cournot) intermediaries is replicated. The Cournot-Walras equilibrium converges to the perfectly competitive equilibrium with no uncertainty. Despite the convergence. the tension between diversification and competition persists when tho economy becomes large, and is manifested in the rates of convergence of price, quantities, and pel capita welfare to their respective limits. To maximize the rate of convergence of pei capita welfar...
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作者：Boucekkine, R; Germain, M; Licandro, O
摘要：This paper is concerned with a non-standard source of fluctuations, called echo effects, i.e., the ability of an economy to reproduce its own past history. In the 1960s. growth theorists believed that this property could arise in vintage capital models, taking the form of replacement echoes. This line of research was stopped after the publication of Solow et al. [15], who showed that echoes should vanish in a Solow growth model with vintage capital. However, the fundamental reason for this res...
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作者：Noldeke, G; Samuelson, L
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：In his work on signaling, Spence proposed a dynamic model of a market in which a buyer revises prices in light of experience and in which sellers. with private information about their types, choose utility-maximizing signals given these prices. We follow Spence's suggestion of introducing perturbations into the resulting dynamic process. In a broad class of markets, our model selects a separating equilibrium outcome if and only if the equilibrium outcome satisfies a version of the undefeated e...
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作者：Shin, SW; Suh, SC
作者单位：University of Windsor
摘要：We explore the possibility of constructing desirable game forms that doubly implement solutions in the commons problem. For thr desirability of a game form, we require that the game form satisfy several properties such as voluntary participation. quantity announcements, forthrightness, nonwastefulness, and best response property. Then we identify a class of solutions which are doubly implementable by such game forms. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：Khan, MA; Rath, KP; Sun, YN
作者单位：University of Notre Dame; National University of Singapore
摘要：We present results on the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in nonatomic games. We also show by means of counterexamples that the stringent conditions on the cardinality of action sets cannot be relaxed, and thus resolve questions which have remained open since Schmeidler's 1973 paper. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：Leach, J
摘要：A union is assumed to make a sequence of ''take it or leave it'' wage demands to a firm which produces a storable good. Equilibrium has the following properties: 1. The firm chooses to accumulate inventories even though there is no uncertainty. 2. The accumulation of inventories lowers wages by reducing the rents from further production and therefore harms the union without benefitting the firm. 3. There can be intermittent work stoppages (i.e., strikes) even though there is no uncertainty. Th...
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作者：Charupat, N; Prisman, EZ
摘要：Existing literature points to the role of market frictions in providing motivations for financial innovations. In this payer, we study the effectiveness of the arbitrage pricing approach and the design and pricing of innovated securities in economies with restrictions on short sales. In the process, we also define the no-arbitrage conditions that is appropriate for such economies. The differences between our results and Chen's [3] are pointed out when appropriate. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
