Endogeneity of alternating offers in a bargaining game
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
McKelvey, RD; Palfrey, TR
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.2225
发表日期：
1997
页码：
425-437
关键词：
摘要：
We investigate an infinite horizon two-person simultaneous move bargaining game with incomplete information and discounted payoffs. The game takes the form of a concession game: in each period, each player chooses to give in or hold out. The game continues until at least one of the players chooses to give in, at which point agreement has been reached and the game terminates. For any discount factor, if the players' priors about each other's type are sufficiently asymmetric, there is a unique Nash equilibrium in which the two players alternate in their willingness to give in. (C) 1997 Academic Press.