Voting under constraints
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Barbera, S; Masso, J; Neme, A
署名单位：
Autonomous University of Barcelona; Universidad Nacional de San Luis
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2301
发表日期：
1997
页码：
298-321
关键词：
摘要：
We consider a broad class of situations where 3 society must choose from a finite set of alternatives. This class includes, as polar cases, those where the preferences of agents are completely unrestricted and those where their preferences are single-peaked. We prove that strategy-proof mechanisms in all these domains must be based on a generalization of the median voter principle. Moreover, they must satisfy a property, to be called the ''intersection property,'' which becomes increasingly stringent as the preference domain is enlarged. In most applications, our results precipitate impossibility theorems. In particular, they imply the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem as a corollary. (C) 1997 Academic Press.