On time inconsistency: A technical issue in stackelberg differential games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Xie, DY
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2308
发表日期：
1997
页码：
412-430
关键词：
摘要：
Stackelberg differential games are useful settings in which optimal government policies can be studied. This paper argues that the analysis of these games involves a key technical issue. In particular, we question the necessity for optimality of one boundary condition invoked in existing literature. The issue is of key interest because the boundary condition is largely responsible for the time inconsistency results previously obtained. We show that the boundary condition is not necessary in some cases. As a result, our finding undermines the credibility of the existing conclusions. (C) 1997 Academic Press.