Learning through reinforcement and replicator dynamics
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Borgers, T; Sarin, R
署名单位：
Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2319
发表日期：
1997
页码：
1-14
关键词：
摘要：
This paper considers a version of R. R. Bush and F. Mosteller's (1951, Psych. Rev. 58. 313-323; 1955, ''Stochastic Models for Learning,'' Wiley, New York) stochastic learning theory in the context of games. We show that in a continuous time limit the learning model converges to the replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory. Thus we provide a non-biological interpretation of evolutionary game theory. (C) 1997 Academic Press.