On a market for coalitions with indivisible agents and lotteries
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Garratt, R; Qin, CZ
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2324
发表日期：
1997
页码：
81-101
关键词：
摘要：
Given a game, the set of joint lotteries over partitions of the agents of any subgame induces a subset of the vectors of balancing weights for the subgame. Games whose subgames are all balanced with respect to these vectors of balancing weights are called totally L-balanced games. We show that such games are precisely the ones that can be generated from direct lottery markets. Total L-balancedness is equivalent to superadditivity. Thus, many interesting games that are not totally balanced, but are superadditive, can be generated from direct lottery markets. We also show that the core of a game coincides with the set of lottery equilibrium utility vectors of its direct lottery. (C) 1997 Academic Press.