Journal of Economic Theory

最新文章

• Dynamic consistency and reference points AI翻译
  作者：Segal, U
  摘要：This note provides a positive answer to the following question. Is it possible to define a set of preference relations, one for each node of a decision tree, such that these preferences satisfy the reduction of compound lotteries axiom and dynamic consistency, and yet do not converge to expected utility? It is argued that updated preferences necessarily have one affine indifference curve but that other indifference curves are unrestricted. A connection is drawn to modelling ''reference points....
• Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations AI翻译
  作者：Forges, F; Minelli, E
  作者单位：University of Brescia
  摘要：We introduce a class of communication equilibria, which we call self-fulfilling mechanisms, and show that they provide a game-theoretic foundation to rational expectations equilibria. Let E be an exchange economy with differential information. We associate a strategic market game Gamma(E) with E. We prove thai the allocations achieved through a self-fulfilling mechanism in Gamma(E) coincide with the rational expectations equilibrium allocations in E. In order to understand how self-fulfilment ...
• Diversification and equilibrium in securities markets AI翻译
  作者：Werner, J
  摘要：Diversification is the strategy of investing small fractions of wealth in each of a large number of securities and thereby reducing risk. The basic argument in support of diversification is an appeal to the Law of Large Numbers. A portfolio in which an investor's wealth is invested in equal fractions in each of N securities with i.i.d. returns, has a return that converges to a riskless return as N increases indefinitely. Any risk averse investor would prefer the limit riskless return to the re...
• Convergence in economic models with Bayesian hierarchies of beliefs AI翻译
  作者：Nyarko, Y
  摘要：I study a model where hierarchies of beliefs (the beliefs about the beliefs of other agents, etc.) are important. I provide conditions under which optimal actions of agents will converge to the Nash equilibrium of the model characterized by the tree, previously unknown ''fundamentals.'' The conditions are (i) a contraction property on the best-response mappings and (ii) a mutual absolute continuity condition on beliefs. Violation of(i) may result in an ''anything is possible'' result: any stoc...
• Fundamental nonconvexities in Arrovian markets and a Coasian solution to the problem of externalities AI翻译
  作者：Boyd, JH; Conley, JP
  作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
  摘要：D. Starrett [J. Econ. Theory 4(1972), 180-199] argues that the presence of externalities implies Fundamental nonconvexities which cause Arrow markets to fail. While this is true, we argue this failure is due to the structure of the Arrovian markets that Starrett uses, and not to the presence of externalities as such. We provide an extension of a general equilibrium public goods model in which properly rights are explicitly treated. Nonconvexities are not fundamental in this framework. We defin...
• A simple cycle preserving extension of a demand function AI翻译
  作者：John, R
  摘要：This note is a short comment on recent contributions by Peters and Wakker who extended classical examples in revealed preference theory by Gale and Shafer to the case of more than three commodities. It is shown that there is a much simpler proof of their results. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
• A theorem on symmetric two-player zero-sum games AI翻译
  作者：Laffond, G; Laslier, JF; LeBreton, M
  作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite; Aix-Marseille Universite; Institut Universitaire de France
  摘要：We prove that if all the off-diagonal entries of the payoff matrix of a finite symmetric two-player zero-sum game are odd integers then there exists a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
• Dynamic monotonicity and comparative statics for real options AI翻译
  作者：Friedman, EJ; Johnson, S
  作者单位：Duke University
  摘要：We analyze thr relationship between complementarities and monotonicity in dynamic programs. While complementarities (supermodularity and nondecreasing differences) are sufficient for monotonic statics ill stochastic dynamic programs: they an only ''robustly'' necessary in a limited may under heavy discounting, Monotonicity oi the: decision rule dues not in general imply monotonicity of the optimal path. In Fact, optimal paths in such models may exhibit extremely complex behavior. Fur convex ad...
• On the optimal taxation of capital income AI翻译
  作者：Jones, LE; Manuelli, RE; Rossi, PE
  作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Chicago
  摘要：We show that in models in which labor services are supplied jointly with human capital, the Chamley and Judd result on zero capital income taxation in the limit extends to labor taxes as long as accumulation technologies are constant returns to scale. Moreover, for a class of widely used preferences, consumption taxes are zero in the limit as well. However, we show by the construction of two examples that these results no longer hold for certains types of restrictions on tax rates or if there ...
• Equilibrium binding agreements AI翻译
  作者：Ray, D; Vohra, R
  作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Brown University; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
  摘要：We study equilibrium binding: agreements, the coalition structures that form under such agreements, and the efficiency of the outcomes that result. We analyze such agreements in a context where the payoff to each player depends on the actions of ail other players. Thus a game in strategic form is a natural starting point. Unlike the device of a characteristic Function, explicit attention is paid to the behavior of the complementary set of players when a coalition blocks a proposed agreement. A...