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作者：Benoit, JP
作者单位：New York University
摘要：We give a simple direct proof of Aumann and Maschler's result that the nucleolus is the contested-garment solution of a bankruptcy game. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：Krebs, T
摘要：This paper combines statistical with economic equilibrium analysis in the context of one-step forward looking economic models. For a given state space, the economic analysis determines a set of Markov processes consistent with economic equilibrium, the set of expectational equilibria. The concept of statistical equilibrium rationalizes the introduction of a probability measure on the set of expectational equilibria. In the infinite observations limit, there exists a unique expectational equili...
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作者：dAspremont, C; Ferreira, RD; GerardVaret, LA
作者单位：Universites de Strasbourg Etablissements Associes; Universite de Strasbourg
摘要：In a pure exchange economy we propose a general equilibrium concept under imperfect competition, the ''Cournotian Monopolistic Competition. Equilibrium,'' and compare it to the Cournot-Walras and the Monopolistic Competition concepts. The advantage of the proposed concept is to require less computational ability from the agents. The comparison is made first through a simple example, then through a mon abstract concept, the P-equilibrium, based on a general notion of price coordination. (C) 199...
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作者：Caplin, A; Nalebuff, B
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：Economic theory offers two different approaches to the analysis of group formation and the role of institutions. General equilibrium approach explores the influence of the economic environment on formation of coalitions. Game theory explores the influence of institutional rules on equilibrium outcomes. We introduce an integrative approach - an institution's policy depends on its membership, while its membership depends on the policies of all the institutions. We present three distinct mathemat...
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作者：Ok, EA
作者单位：New York University
摘要：I study the problem of ranking distributions of opportunity sets on the basis of equality. The analysis begins by developing alternative ways of formulating the notion of equalizing transfers in the context of opportunity distributions. It is readily observed that any such formulation must rely on agents' preferences over individual opportunity sets. and therefore. a theory of opportunity inequality measurement must be conditional upon the social opportunity set ranking one postulates. Unfortu...
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作者：Serrano, R
摘要：The reduced game relevant for the consistency of the prekernel is used to reinterpret this solution concept in a way that makes it independent of interpersonal utility comparisons. Based on this reinterpretation, a non-cooperative model is presented that yields in stationary equilibria the prekernel (kernel) for the class of monotonic transferable utility games. Next, we apply the same non-cooperative model to more general coalitional games. For pure bargaining problems, the model yields the N...
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作者：Balasko, Y; Cres, H
作者单位：heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Majority voting aggregates individual preference profiles into a binary relation on the set of alternatives. Condorcet cycles are cycles of the aggregated binary relation. We show that the relative volume of the subset of the (n!-1)-simplex that represents profile distributions such that the aggregated preferences display Condorcet cycles is a decreasing Function of the super majority level tau bounded by the expression n!(1-tau/0.4714)(n!). This expression shows that Condorcet cycles become r...
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作者：Kohlberg, E; Reny, PJ
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：Relative probabilities compare the likelihoods of any pair of events, even those with probability zero. Definitions of weak and strong independence of random variables on finite relative probability spaces are introduced. The former is defined directly, while the latter is defined in terms of approximations by ordinary probabilities. Our main result is a characterization of strong independence in terms of weak independence and exchangeability. This result is applied to game theory to obtain a ...
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作者：BenPorath, E; Gilboa, I; Schmeidler, D
作者单位：Northwestern University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：To take into account both es ante and es post inequality considerations, one has ro deal with inequality and uncertainty simultaneously. Under certainty, much of the literature has focused on ''comonotonically linear'' indices: functionals that are linear on cones or income profiles that agree on the social ranking of the individuals. This family generalizes both the Gini index and the egalitarian index (minimal income). However, it does not include functionals such as the average of expected-...
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作者：Russell, S
摘要：This paper describes a class of overlapging-generations economies that have ''quasifundamental'' (QF) equilibria-equilibria in which the price level and inflation rate are positively correlated with a ''fundamental'' random variable, despite the existence of an alternative, Pareto-dominant equilibrium in which the price level and/or inflation rate are constant. In QF equilibria the inflation rate is ''excessively variable'' using either quantitative or welfare-based variability measures. These...
