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作者：Benhabib, J; Rustichini, A
作者单位：New York University; Tilburg University
摘要：In the problem of optimal taxation in an economy with labor and capital, the optimal solution when the government can commit to a sequence of tax rates entails that the tax on capital tends to zero in the limit, with all the tax burden on labor. It is well known, however, that this solution is time inconsistent; so if the commitment power is not perfect, this second best tax plan will not be sustainable. We model explicitly the trade-off between the cost of revising the tax plan, and the benef...
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作者：Kim, T; Yannelis, NC
作者单位：Seoul National University (SNU); University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：We prove the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for a Bayesian game with infinitely many players. We make three main advances to the existing literature. In particular: 1. We provide existence theorems where the set of agents can be an infinite set (countable or uncountable) as well as a measure space. 2. We use the information partition approach to model the differential information rather than the type set approach and therefore, our equilibrium is in behavioral strategies rather than ...
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作者：Anderson, SP; Goeree, JK; Ramer, R
作者单位：University of Amsterdam
摘要：We analyze the canonical location-then-price duopoly game with general log concave consumer densities. A unique pure-strategy equilibrium to the two-stage game exists if the density is not ''too asymmetric'' and not ''too concave.'' These criteria are satisfied by many commonly used densities. Equilibrium locations are closer, and prices lower, the tighter the density. Our results apply also to a vertical differentiation specification. Symmetric densities that are ''too concave'' have no symme...
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作者：Gollier, C; Lindsey, J; Zeckhauser, RJ
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Harvard University
摘要：The hypothesis examined in this paper is that the greater the investor's flexibility, the easier it is for him to change his portfolio depending on his results, the more willing he will be to accept risks. When the investor has no control on the size of the risky investment, but can choose between one risky and one riskless asset, this conjecture is shown to be correct. However, if there is more than one risky asset each period, counterexamples demonstrate that flexibility rarely ensures great...
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作者：Park, IU
摘要：This paper shows generic determinacy of equilibria for sender-receiver cheap-talk games: for a generic set of utilities on outcomes, there are a finite number of reduced form equilibria. A corollary is that generically the set of probability distributions over outcomes generated by equilibria is finite. Because of the identification of terminal nodes for utility purposes, Sard's theorem is not applicable in the way used in Kreps and Wilson [1], and a new proof strategy is developed. It is also...
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作者：Ohashi, K
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University
摘要：We study the optimal futures information in a dynamic economy and investigate how the results obtained in a static economy should be modified due to the possibility of dynamic trading. We analyze three different notions of ex ante optimality, depending on the authority's ability to redistribute wealth among the investors and characterize the optimal futures innovation in each sense. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：Sung, J
摘要：We present an agency model to examine the use of corporate insurance by publicly held firms. We assume that insurance companies serve as investigators verifying whether or not accidents were insured. When the manager performs multiple tasks to reduce the expected number of accidents, the verification results can be used to produce a pair of managerial performance measures. We show that the optimal pair of performance measures tan be obtained when the corporate insurance policy covers all uncon...
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作者：Battigalli, P
摘要：This paper analyzes Pearce's notion of extensive form rationalizability (EFR). Although EFR was originally defined as a reduction procedure, this paper shows that it can be characterized in terms of restrictions on players' updating systems. These restrictions correspond to a common hierarchy of nested hypotheses. Next the relationship of EFR to more familiar reduction procedures is examined. In generic games of perfect information, EFR is realization-equivalent to iterated weak dominance and ...
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作者：Bona, JL; Santos, MS
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：This essay is concerned with computation as a tool for the analysis of mathematical models in economics, It is our contention that the use of high-performance computers is likely to play the substantial role in providing understanding of economic models that it does with regard to models in the physical and biological sciences. The main thrust of our commentary is that numerical simulations of mathematical models are in certain respects like experiments performed in a laboratory, and that this...
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作者：McLennan, A
摘要：For finite pure strategy sets S-1,...,S-n if E subset of S = S-1 x ... x S-n is the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria for an open set of payoffs vectors, then #E less than or equal to #S/(max(i) #S-i). There is an open set of payoff vectors for which there are #S/(max(i) #S-i) pure Nash equilibria. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
