Implementing coordinated team play
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Arya, A; Glover, J; Hughes, JS
署名单位：
Carnegie Mellon University; Duke University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.2249
发表日期：
1997
页码：
218-232
关键词：
摘要：
This note studies a moral hazard model of joint production in which there are strong gains to coordination. The mechanism we propose for resolving the tacit collusion problem that arises in our setting makes use of at-will contracts which provide the agents with the option to quit at any time. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82. (C) 1997 Academic Press.