On the dynamic efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Qiu, LD
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2270
发表日期：
1997
页码：
213-229
关键词：
摘要：
This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with R&D (research and development) competition. It shows that Cournot competition induces more R&D effort than Bertrand competition. However, the price is lower and output is larger in Bertrand than in Cournot competition. Furthermore, the Bertrand equilibrium is more efficient than the Cournot equilibrium if either R&D productivity is low, or spillovers are weak, or products are very different. If R&D productivity is high, spillovers are strong, and goods are close substitutes, then the Bertrand equilibrium is less efficient than the Cournot equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: L13. (C) 1997 Academic Press.