Comparing Cournot and Bertrand in a homogeneous product market
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Dastidar, KG
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2268
发表日期：
1997
页码：
205-212
关键词：
摘要：
This paper examines some general notions relating to the comparison of Cournot and Bertrand equilibrium outcomes. Results obtained by Vives in this connection are reconsidered in a homogeneous product market and it is shown that these results are sensitive to the marker sharing rules. It is found that the results are always true under those market sharing rules which have the property of including the competitive equilibrium in the set of Bertrand equilibria (for example, the ''capacity sharing'' rule). IF, however, the sharing rule does not have this property (for example, the ''equal sharing'' rule), then the results, referred to above, may not hold when costs are asymmetric. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: L13. (C) 1997 Academic Press.