Preference, rationalizability and equilibrium
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Epstein, LG
署名单位：
University of British Columbia; University of British Columbia
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.2229
发表日期：
1997
页码：
1-29
关键词：
摘要：
In the context of finite normal form games, this paper addresses the formalization and implications of the hypothesis that players are rational and that this is common knowledge. The innovation is to admit notions of rationality other than subjective expected utility maximization. For example, rationality can be defined by the alternative restrictions that preferences are probabilistically sophisticated conform to the multiple-priors model or are monotonic. The noted hypothesis is related to suitably defined notions of correlated rationalizability, survival of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies and a posteriori equilibrium. (C) 1997 Academic Press.