The maximal generic number of pure Nash equilibria
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
McLennan, A
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.2213
发表日期：
1997
页码：
408-410
关键词：
摘要：
For finite pure strategy sets S-1,...,S-n if E subset of S = S-1 x ... x S-n is the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria for an open set of payoffs vectors, then #E less than or equal to #S/(max(i) #S-i). There is an open set of payoff vectors for which there are #S/(max(i) #S-i) pure Nash equilibria. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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