On rationalizability in extensive games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Battigalli, P
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.2252
发表日期：
1997
页码：
40-61
关键词：
摘要：
This paper analyzes Pearce's notion of extensive form rationalizability (EFR). Although EFR was originally defined as a reduction procedure, this paper shows that it can be characterized in terms of restrictions on players' updating systems. These restrictions correspond to a common hierarchy of nested hypotheses. Next the relationship of EFR to more familiar reduction procedures is examined. In generic games of perfect information, EFR is realization-equivalent to iterated weak dominance and backward induction. Equivalence with iterated weak dominance is complete in the subset of games with ''iterated perfect information.'' Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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