Generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions for sender-receiver cheap-talk games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Park, IU
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2309
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 431-448

摘要

This paper shows generic determinacy of equilibria for sender-receiver cheap-talk games: for a generic set of utilities on outcomes, there are a finite number of reduced form equilibria. A corollary is that generically the set of probability distributions over outcomes generated by equilibria is finite. Because of the identification of terminal nodes for utility purposes, Sard's theorem is not applicable in the way used in Kreps and Wilson [1], and a new proof strategy is developed. It is also shown that the set of sender types is the efficient message space supporting all reduced form equilibria. (C) 1997 Academic Press.