Corporate insurance and managerial incentives
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Sung, J
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.2260
发表日期：
1997
页码：
297-332
关键词：
摘要：
We present an agency model to examine the use of corporate insurance by publicly held firms. We assume that insurance companies serve as investigators verifying whether or not accidents were insured. When the manager performs multiple tasks to reduce the expected number of accidents, the verification results can be used to produce a pair of managerial performance measures. We show that the optimal pair of performance measures tan be obtained when the corporate insurance policy covers all uncontrollable accidents and some controllable accidents that are ''costlier'' for the manager to control. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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