Does rational learning lead to Nash equilibrium in finitely repeated games?
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Sandroni, A
署名单位：
Northwestern University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2352
发表日期：
1998
页码：
195-218
关键词：
摘要：
A stage game is played for many periods. Each player maximizes discounted expected payoffs, given updated beliefs about opponent's strategies. For the case of infinitely repeated games, Kalai and Lehrer [8, 9] show that, under absolute continuity, rational learning leads to Nash equilibrium. Absolute continuity, however, does not ensure convergence to approximate Nash equilibrium play in games of long (but finite) horizon. I show that asymptotic continuity is equivalent to absolute continuity in infinitely repeated games and ensures convergence to Nash equilibrium in finite horizon games. These results unify the learning theory in finitely and infinitely repeated games. (C) 1998 Academic Press.