Evolving aspirations and cooperation
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Karandikar, R; Mookherjee, D; Ray, D; Vega-Redondo, F
署名单位：
Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; Boston University; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Universitat d'Alacant; Universitat d'Alacant
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2379
发表日期：
1998
页码：
292-331
关键词：
摘要：
A 2 x 2 game is played repeatedly by two satisficing players. The game considered includes the Prisoner's Dilemma, as well as games of coordination and common interest. Each player has an aspiration at each date, and takes an action. The action is switched at the subsequent period only if the achieved payoff falls below aspirations; the switching probability depends on the shortfall. Aspirations are periodically updated according to payoff experience: but are occasionally subject to trembles. For sufficiently slow updating of aspirations and small tremble probability, it is shown that both players must ultimately cooperate most of the time. (C) 1998 Academic Press.