Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Alcalde, J; Perez-Castrillo, D; Romero-Medina, A
署名单位：
Universitat d'Alacant; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2447
发表日期：
1998
页码：
469-480
关键词：
摘要：
We implement the stable correspondence of a job matching market in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. We use a simple sequential mechanism in which firms propose a salary to each worker (first stage) and, then, each worker accepts at most one proposal (second stage). Moreover, if agents preferences are additive, this mechanism implements in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium the firms' optimal correspondence when firms use undominated strategies. Finally, we construct another simple sequential mechanism where the order of decisions is permuted and which implements the workers' optimal correspondence when agents' preferences are additive. (C) 1998 Academic Press.