Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Bergin, J; Sen, A
署名单位：
Queens University - Canada; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2388
发表日期：
1998
页码：
222-256
关键词：
摘要：
We study the implementation of social choice rules in incomplete information environments. A sufficiency condition called posterior reversal is given for extensive form implementation. The condition has a natural interpretation in signaling terms: Consistent posterior distributions under truth-telling are different from consistent posteriors under deception. This variation in the distribution over player types leads to variation in the distribution over actions and outcomes (comparing truth-telling and deception). We exploit this feature to implement social choice rules. (C) 1998 Academic Press.