On the long run implications of repeated moral hazard
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Phelan, C
署名单位：
Northwestern University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2389
发表日期：
1998
页码：
174-191
关键词：
摘要：
This paper analyzes the effects of moral hazard on long-run consumption or utility. Given exponential utility, it is shown that the utility of those with unobservable endowments becomes arbitrarily negative as long as any positive fraction of otherwise identical agents have observable endowments. Next, it is shown that assuming a finite number of agents results in essentially the same outcomes as with a continuum of agents. Finally, it is shown that the key characteristic determining whether the utility of almost all agents becomes arbitrarily low is whether lim(c-->infinity) U'(c) is bounded away from zero. (C) 1998 Academic Press.