On renegotiation-proof collusion under imperfect public information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yoon, K
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1998.2500
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 328-336
• 关键词: renegotiation-proof equilibrium; collusion; Cournot-Nash equilibrium

摘要

Wt construct a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium in Green and Porter's (1984, Econometrica 52, 87-100) imperfect public information model, which Paretodominates the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D43, D82. (C) 1999 Academic Press.