A note on Matsushima's regularity condition
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Chung, KS
署名单位：
University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2545
发表日期：
1999
页码：
429-433
关键词：
摘要：
This note first uses a simple example to show that H. Matsushima's (1991, J. Econ. Theory 54, 198-203) regularity condition, to the contrary of his claim, actually does not imply C. d'Aspremont and L.-A. Gerard-Varet's (1979, J. Public Ei on. 11, 25-45) compatibility condition. It then proves a stronger version of Matsushima's proposition, namely that efficient public decision rules can be truthfully implemented with budget-balancing mechanisms under the, weak regularity condition. (C) 1999 Academic Press.