Implementation with extensive form games: One round of signaling is not enough
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Brusco, S
署名单位：
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2546
发表日期：
1999
页码：
356-378
关键词：
摘要：
In situations of complete information, when a social choice function can be implemented using an extensive form game. it is always the case that there is an equilibrium which does not go beyond the first stage (that is, an equilibrium with one round of signaling). We show that this is not true in the incomplete information case. We provide: an example in which a social choice function cannot be implemented with an extensive form game if the mechanism has an equilibrium with one round of signaling and we put some restrictions on the way in which out of-equilibrium beliefs are formed. The social choice function can, however. be implemented using an extensive form mechanism. but the equilibrium hits to reach the second stage. (C) 1999 Academic Press.