Efficiency in sequential partnerships
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Strausz, R
署名单位：
Free University of Berlin
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1998.2496
发表日期：
1999
页码：
140-156
关键词：
摘要：
We consider sequential partnerships in which agents obtain non-verifiable information about the actions taken by previous agents. For such partnerships a budget-balanced sharing rule exists that induces efficient production. The sharing rule has many desirable features: (1) it uniquely implements efficient production, (2) it does not rely on message games, (3) it does not rely on unlimited liability, and (4) it is robust to renegotiation. The rule is furthermore simple; intuitive; and robust to sabotage, coalition formation, and noise. It also induces efficient production when agents obtain incomplete information about previous actions. (C) 1999 Academic Press.