Bargaining, production, and monotonicity in economic environments
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Chen, MA; Maskin, ES
署名单位：
Harvard University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2562
发表日期：
1999
页码：
140-147
关键词：
摘要：
The automatic bargaining theory of J. Nash (1950. Econometrica 18. 155-162) presumes that only status quo utilities and the shape of the utility possibilities set are relevant to the bargaining outcome. Here we consider a class of economic problems for which bargaining solutions may depend on more than just utility information. (A fifty-fifty split of a single good between two bargainers is one example of such a solution.) It is shown that the requirements of Pareto efficiency), weak symmetry, and technological monotonicity (i.e., bargainers should gain from technological improvement) combine to characterize welfare egalitarianism. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C78. (C) 1999 Academic Press.