On interdependent supergames: Multimarket contact, concavity, and collusion
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Spagnolo, G
署名单位：
Stockholm School of Economics; University of Cambridge
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2548
发表日期：
1999
页码：
127-139
关键词：
摘要：
Following Bernheim and Whinston (1990), this paper addresses the effects of multimarket contact on firms' ability to collude. Real world imperfections tend to make firms' objective function strictly concave and market supergames interdependent: firms' payoffs in each market depend on how they are doing in others. Then, multimarket contact always facilitates collusion. It may even make collusion sustainable in all markets when otherwise it would not be sustainable in any. The effects of conglomeration are discussed. Multigame contact is shown to facilitate cooperation in supergames other than oligopolies as long as agents' objective function is submodular in material payoffs. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D43, L13, L21. (C) 1999 Academic Press.