Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Vohra, R
署名单位：
Brown University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2512
发表日期：
1999
页码：
123-147
关键词：
摘要：
We consider an exchange economy in which agents possess private information at the time of engaging in state contingent contracts. While communication of private information is permitted, the true information state is not verifiable. The enforcement of contracts is, therefore, limited by incentive compatibility constraints. We formalize a notion of the core for such an economy. Our analysis can be viewed as an attempt to incorporate incentive compatibility in the coarse core of R. Wilson (1978, Econometrica 46, 807-816), or as an attempt to introduce coalitional contracts in the notion of incentive efficiency of B. Holmstrom and R. Myerson (1983, Econometrica 51, 1799-1819). While there are some special cases in which the incentive compatible core is non-empty, our main result shows that is not generally true. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
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