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作者：Feinberg, Y
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：It is shown that if agents cannot agree to disagree then, under an appropriate compactness condition their beliefs are derivable from a common prior-establishing the converse to the agreement theorem of Aumann (1976, Ann. Statist. 4, 1236-1239). This enables us to formulate the existence of a common prior in syntactic terms, i.e., making no use of the space of states of the world, but referring only to the current knowledge and beliefs of the agents. An example demonstrates that the compactnes...
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作者：Loewenstein, M; Willard, GA
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study rational equilibrium asset-pricing bubbles in an economic environment in which agents are allowed to trade continuously, including as special cases some models From financial economics. For positive net supply assets, we present new necessary and sufficient conditions For the absence of bubbles in complete and incomplete markets equilibria with several types of borrowing constraints. For zero net supply assets. including financial derivatives with finite maturities, we show that bubbl...
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作者：DeMichelis, S; Germano, F
作者单位：University of Pavia; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We show a fundamental property of dynamics whose zeros are essentially the Nash equilibria of underlying games. namely. the indices of zeros coincide with the degrees of the projection from the graph of the Nash correspondence onto the underlying space of games. This is important since it implies that ibr a wide class of dynamics local stability propel ties of zeros are determined by the geometry of the Nash correspondence, providing further links between learning or evolutionary game theory, ...
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作者：Diermeier, D; Merlo, A
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：In this paper we consider a dynamic model of government formation in parliamentary democracies that accounts for the following phenomena: (1) minority and surplus governments; (2) cabinet reshuffles; (3) cabinet terminations due to replacement of early elections; (4) the relative instability of minority governments. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D72 . H19. C73. (C) 2000 Academic Press.
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作者：Epstein, LG
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：Working in a complete-markets setting, a property of asset demands is identified that thai is inconsistent with the investor's preference being based on probabilities. In this way, a market counterpart of the Ellsberg Paradox is provided. Journal Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D00. D80. D81. (C) 2000 Academic Press.
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作者：Fraser, CD
作者单位：University of Leicester; University of Leicester
摘要：Using the homogeneous of degree zero inverse congestion (quality) function employed most frequently in the literature, we characterise completely the families of utility Functions which are then necessary and sufficient for break-even utilitarian welfare maximising provision of club goods with self-selection to be separable from distribution. Two types of separation-involving, alternatively (a) the price and quality; (b) the price, duality, facility size and total utilisation-are considered. W...
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作者：Corradi, V; Sarin, R
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：Continuous approximations that are ordinary differential equations (ODEs) or stochastic differential equations (SDEs) are often used to study the properties of discrete stochastic processes. We show that different ways of taking the continuous limit of the same model may result in either an ODE or a SDE and study the manner in which each approximates the discrete model. We compare the asymptotic properties of the continuous equations with those of the discrete dynamics and show that they tend ...
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作者：Blackorby, C; Bossert, W; Donaldson, D
作者单位：University of British Columbia; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：Discounting the utilities of future people or giving smaller weights to groups other than one's own is often criticized on the grounds that the resulting objective function differs from the ethically appropriate one. This paper investigates the consequences of changes in the discount rate and weights when they are moved toward the warranted ones. Using the utilitarian value function, it is shown that, except in restrictive special casts, those moves do not necessarily lead to social improvemen...
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作者：Arya, A; Glover, J; Rajan, U
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：This paper studies implementation in a principal agent model of adverse selection. We explore ways in which the additional structure of principal agent models (compared to general implementation models) simplifies the implementation problem. We develop a connection between the single crossing property and monotonicity conditions which are necessary for Nash and Bayesian Nash implementation. We also construct simple implementing mechanisms that rely on the single crossing property and on assump...
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作者：Ellison, G; Fudenberg, D
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Harvard University
摘要：We examine the local stability of mixed equilibria in a smoothed fictitious play model. Our model is easy to analyze and yields the same conclusions as other models in 2 x 2 games. We focus on 3 x 3 games. Contrary to some previous suggestions, learning can sometimes provide a justification for complicated mixed equilibria. Whether an equilibrium is stable often depends on the distribution of payoff perturbations. The totally mixed equilibria of zero sum games are generically stable, and the t...
