Perturbed adaptive dynamics in coalition form games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Agastya, M
署名单位：
University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2574
发表日期：
1999
页码：
207-233
关键词：
摘要：
Players adaptively learn how to bargain. A characteristic function describes the available surplus. The underlying bargaining game extends the Nash demand game by allowing subcoalitions to reach an agreement. Players' demands must be multiples of a money unit. We show that stochastically stable allocations (SSA) (i.e., allocations that are most stable to unlikely errors) are a subset of the core. Uniqueness does not obtain even when the money unit becomes arbitrarily small. Nonetheless, every SSA is related to the allocation that maximizes the product of players' utilities over the core; i.e., constrained egalitarian solution for TU-games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C72, C78. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
来源URL：