Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Dekel, E; Fudenberg, D; Levine, DK
署名单位：
Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2576
发表日期：
1999
页码：
165-185
关键词：
摘要：
In a self-confirming equilibrium, each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents will take along the equilibrium path, but may be mistaken about the way that opponents would respond to deviations. This paper develops a refinement of self-confirming equilibrium in which players use information about opponents' payoffs in forming beliefs about the way that opponents play off of the equilibrium path. We show that this concept is robust to payoff uncertainty. We also discuss its relationship to other concepts and show that it is closely related to assuming almost common certainty of payoffs in an epistemic model with independent beliefs. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D84. (C) 1999 Academic Press.