Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Sönmez, T
署名单位：
University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Koc University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2507
发表日期：
1999
页码：
148-156
关键词：
摘要：
We study manipulation via pre-arranged matches in the context of centralized two-sided matching markets. We show that the solution that is used to match the hospitals and medical residents in the United States, namely the hospital-optimal stable rule, is manipulable in this way. Unfortunately this is a general problem: We show that there is no solution that is both stable and non-manipulable. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
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