Perfect foresight and equilibrium selection in symmetric potential games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Hofbauer, J; Sorger, G
署名单位：
University of Vienna; University of Vienna
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1998.2485
发表日期：
1999
页码：
1-23
关键词：
摘要：
The equilibrium selection approach of Matsui and Matsuyama (J. Econ. Theory 65 (1995), 415-434) which is based on rational players who maximize their discounted future payoff, is analyzed for symmetric two-player games with a potential function. It is shown that the maximizer of the potential function is the unique state that is absorbing and globally accessible for small discount rates. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
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