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作者：Jin, JY
作者单位：Queens University Belfast
摘要：I show that concealing cost is the dominant strategy in Bertrand oligopoly. generalising a result of Gal-Or (1986, Rev. Econ. Stud 53. 85 -92) and correcting an error of Raith (1996, J. Econ. Theory 71, 260 288). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers. D43. L13. (C) 2000 Academic Press.
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作者：Ghirardato, P; Le Breton, M
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：Consider a decision problem under uncertainty for a decision maker with known (utility) payoffs over prizes. We say that an act is Choquet (Shafer, Bernoulli),rational if for some capacity (belief function, probability) over the set of states, it maximizes her expected utility. We show that an act may be Choquet rational without being Bernoulli rational, but it is Choquet rational if and only if it is Shafer rational. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D81.;(C) 2000 Ac...
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作者：Myerson, RB
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Existence of equilibria is proven for Poisson games with compact type sets and finite action sets. Then three theorems are introduced for characterizing limits of probabilities in Poisson games when the expected number of players becomes large. The magnitude theorem characterizes the rate at which probabilities of events go to zero. Thr offset theorem characterizes the ratios of probabilities of events that differ by a finite additive translation. The hyperplane theorem estimates probabilities...
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作者：Sprumont, Y
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We analyze collective choices in game forms from a revealed preference viewpoint. We call the joint choice behavior of n agents Nash- (respectively, Pareto-) rationalizable if there exist n preferences over the conceivable joint actions such that the joint actions selected from each game form coincide with the Nash equilibria (respectively, the Pareto optima) of the corresponding game. In the two-agent case, we show that every deterministic joint behavior which is Nash-rationalizable is also P...
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作者：Vega-Redondo, F
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Universitat d'Alacant
摘要：Consider a large population of finitely-lived agents organized into n different hierarchical levels. Every period, all those placed at each level are randomly matched to play a given symmetric game. Based on the resulting outcome, a rho-fraction of agents who (within their own level) attain the highest payoffs are promoted upwards. On the other hand, newcomers replacing those who die every period enter at the lowest level and choose irreversibly the strategy to be played for the rest of their ...
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作者：Olson, LJ; Roy, S
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; State University System of Florida; Florida International University
摘要：We examine the efficiency of conservation of a renewable resource whose natural productivity is influenced by random environmental disturbances. We allow for non-concave biological production and stock-dependent social welfare. Unlike deterministic models, conservation may be inefficient no matter how productive the resource growth function is. In addition, improvements in the natural productivity of the resource might increase the possibility of extinction. We characterize the conditions on s...
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作者：Burke, JL
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Indianapolis
摘要：After dropping the standard general-equilibrium assumption that preference orders discount future consumption faster than the economy grows and dropping continuity and weakening utility representation, we establish commodity prices and consumptions that approach approximate equilibrium to within any practical tolerance. The Weizacker-overtaking criterion defines the best-known non-standard-discounting orders we admit over discrete-time. deterministic consumption paths and over continuous-time,...
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作者：Berga, D; Serizawa, S
作者单位：Universitat de Girona; Tohoku University
摘要：In the context of the provision of one pure public good, we study how large a preference domain can be to allow for the existence of strategy-proof rules satisfying the no vetoer condition. This question is qualified by the additional requirement that a domain should include a minimally rich domain. We first characterize generalized median voter schemes as the unique class of strategy-proof rules on minimally rich domains. Then we establish that the unique maximal domain, including a minimally...
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作者：Sobel, J
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Economic theorists have intensively studied learning in games and decisions over the last decade. This essay puts some of the work in perspective and offers opinions about what still needs to be learned. Journal Or Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73, D83. (C) 2000 Academic Press.
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作者：Pattanaik, PK; Xu, YS
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; University of Nottingham
摘要：This paper examines how freedom of choice as reflected in an agent's opportunity sets can be measured in economic environments where opportunity sets are non empty and compact subsets of the non-negative orthant of the n-dimensional real space. Several plausible axioms are proposed for this purpose. It is then shown that, under different sets of axioms, one can represent the ranking of compact opportunity sets by different types of real-valued functions with intuitively plausible properties. J...
