Reputation versus social learning
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Jackson, MO; Kalai, E
署名单位：
California Institute of Technology; Northwestern University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2538
发表日期：
1999
页码：
40-59
关键词：
摘要：
A folk theorem of game theory illustrates that strategic use of reputation can drastically alter the equilibrium play of an isolated group of n-players engaged in a finitely repeated game. We show that this folk theorem may fail in social settings where many groups of n-players play the game sequentially. The ability to strategically use reputation dies out over time due to players' opportunity to observe the play of earlier groups. This phenomenon is demonstrated in a model of Bayesian recurring games by using old and new techniques from the rational learning literature combined with a notion of purification. Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D83. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
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