Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Battigalli, P; Siniscalchi, M
署名单位：
Princeton University; European University Institute
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2555
发表日期：
1999
页码：
188-230
关键词：
摘要：
The epistemic analysis of solution concepts for dynamic games involves statements about the players' beliefs conditional upon different histories of play, their conditional beliefs about each other's conditional beliefs, etc. To represent such statements, we construct a space of infinite (coherent) hierarchies of conditional probability systems, defined with respect to ii fixed collection of. relevant hypotheses concerning an external state (e.g., the strategy profile being played.) As an application, we derive results about common certainly of the opponent's rationality conditonal on an arbitrary collection of histories in multistage games with observed actions and (possibly) incomplete information. Classification Numbers: C72, D82. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
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